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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On July 12, 2002, the headline of the Wall Street Journal (hereinafter WSJ) read 
“IRS Releases Names of People in Disputed KPMG Tax Shelters.”2  The article 
                                                                
1Beckett G. Cantley (University of California, Berkeley, B.A., 1989; Southwestern 
University School of Law, J.D., cum laude, 1995; and University of Florida, College of Law, 
LL.M. in taxation, 1997) is a Professor of Law at St. Thomas University School of Law. 
2Glenn R. Simpson & John D. McKinnon, IRS Names People Who Used  Disputed KPMG 
Tax Shelters, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2002, at A1. 
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contained the names of several prominent taxpayers, including the current 
Republican nominee for Governor of California,3 a deceased champion stock car 
racer,4 a deceased former Secretary of the Treasury,5 and the CEOs of several public 
companies.6  The article had culled the names of the taxpayers from a public filing of 
a lawsuit instigated by the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter IRS) against KPMG 
LLP (hereinafter KPMG), a “Big Four” accounting firm.7  The lawsuit8 between the 
IRS and KPMG was a summons enforcement action in which the IRS was requesting 
KPMG to turn over certain taxpayer documents relating to alleged tax shelters 
promoted by KPMG9 and entered into by the named taxpayers.  KPMG had 
previously invoked attorney-client and section 7525 privileges10 on behalf of the 
taxpayers in an attempt to prevent the release of the taxpayer documents to the IRS.11  
As part of the invocation of privilege, KPMG had to provide the IRS with a privilege 
log that set forth the names of the taxpayers relating to the alleged privileged 
documents.12  Historically, the names of taxpayers in such a privilege log would not 
                                                                
3Id. (listing William E Simon, Jr., Republican nominee for Governor of California as one 
of the clients of  KPMG’s disputed  tax shelters).   
4Id. (naming Dale Earnhardt, deceased former world champion stock car driver, as a client 
of KPMG).   
5Id. (releasing the name of William E. Simon, Sr., former Secretary of the Treasury, as 
having relationships with the alleged KPMG tax Shelters).  
6Id.  Henry Nicholas III, CEO of Broadcom Corp., Robert K. Shaye, Chairman of New 
Line Cinema, and Richard J. Heckermann, former Chairman of U.S. Filter Corp., were all 
named in the Wall Street Journal article.  
7The current “Big Four” accounting firms include KPMG, Deloitte & Touche, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young.  
8United States of America v. KPMG LLP, Petition to Enforce Internal Revenue Service 
Summonses, No.  1:02MS00295 (D.D.C. filed July 9, 2002) [hereinafter Petition].   
9Id.  Taxpayer information was being sought for several different alleged tax shelters, 
including alleged tax shelters named the Foreign Leveraged Investment Program [hereinafter 
FLIP] and the Offshore Portfolio Investment Strategy [hereinafter OPIS].   
10I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1) (2002) provides that: 
With respect to tax advice, the same common law protections of confidentiality which 
apply to a communication between a taxpayer and an attorney shall also apply to a 
communication between a taxpayer and any federally authorized tax practitioner to the 
extent the communication would be considered a privileged communication if it were 
between a taxpayer and an attorney. 
Id. 
11See generally, Justice Department, Privilege Log for January 28, 2002 Summons to 
KPMG LLP, reprinted in KPMG Privilege Log Released by Justice Department, 2002 TAX  
NOTES  TODAY 140-83 (July 10, 2002).  
12For example, one of the summons issued by the IRS required KPMG to provide all 
information pertaining to three of KPMG’s tax shelter transactions.  These transactions 
referred to as BLIP, BLIPS, TRAC, TRACT and IDV by KPMG’s record provided in 
pertinent part: 
If a privilege is being claimed with respect to any requested document or information, 
state with specificity the nature of the privilege and the extent of all allegedly 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss1/3
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be released by the IRS, even in a summons enforcement action.13  The publication of 
names caused a large backlash among certain commentators14 and Freedom of 
                                                          
privileged matters.  If you object to producing only part of a document, provide us  
with a redacted copy and retain the original for review by a court (the part to which 
you object and produce the remainder).  With respect to each allegedly privileged 
document, or portion of a document, provide the following: 
1. The date appearing on such document or, if has no date, the date or 
approximate date that such document was created; 
2. The identity or descriptive code number, file number, title, or label of such 
document used by the custodian of the document to identify it for retrieval; 
3. The general nature and description of such document and the identity of the 
person who signed such document and, if it was not signed, the response 
shall so state and give the identity of the person(s) who prepared it; 
4. The identity of the person to whom such document was addressed and the 
identity of each person other than such addressee to whom such document, 
or a copy thereof were given or sent at any time; 
5. The identity, if known, of the person having or who may have present 
possession, custody, or control of such document or a copy thereof; and  
6. Whether or not any draft, copy, or reproduction of such document contains 
any postscripts, notation, change, or addendum not appearing on the 
document itself and, if so, the response shall give the description of each 
such draft, copy or reproduction.” 
Petition, supra note 8.  
13The fact that taxpayer names are historically redacted from such public documents was 
underscored by the IRS Chief Counsel in a letter to the editors of the Wall Street Journal when 
he stated: 
We take seriously our public responsibilities to preserve confidences, including, 
wherever possible, the names of innocent third parties.  It is for this reason that 
documents revealing the identity of third parties is unnecessary to the conduct of 
litigation are often redacted or filed under seal to protect their privacy. 
See Internal Revenue Service & Justice Department, IRS and Justice Letter on KPMG 
Privilege Log Disclosure, 2002 TAX  NOTES TODAY 145-71 (July 19, 2002). 
14For example, the Wall Street Journal wrote a scathing editorial article entitled “The IRS 
Out of Control” that stated in pertinent part: 
We knew the Internal Revenue Service’s tax-collection arsenal included, among other 
things, the legal right to audit, sue and penalize tax cheats.  But until last week we 
didn’t know the agency had license to gratuitously humiliate innocent taxpayers in the 
process. 
On Friday, the Journal reported on page one that the IRS has disclosed the 
names of hundreds of citizens engaged in what amounts to tax planning.  These 
individuals – many of them prominent businessmen – are accused of no wrongdoing.  
Their only sin is that they are clients of KPMG, the accounting firm currently doing 
battle in court with the IRS. 
Last week the Justice Department sued KPMG on behalf of the IRS.  The 
government alleged that some of KPMG’s tax shelters are illegal and requested the 
names of clients who had inquired about them.  The accounting firm complied, 
providing the names in a so-called “privilege log” to protect their identities.  The IRS 
promptly whent public with the names, blithely smearing the reputations of innocent 
third-party individuals in an effort to strong-arm its court opponent and embarrass its 
clients.   
This is a dangerous and outrageous precedent.  To begin with, not all tax shelters 
are illegal, and a court has to rule on the ones in question.  Nor is it against the law to 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2002
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Information Act requests were sent to the U.S. Treasury Department,15 the IRS16 and 
the U.S. Department of Justice (hereinafter DOJ)17 seeking to discover internal 
government documents as to who made this decision and how it was made.  
Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (hereinafter the Code) 
provides that certain taxpayer information is confidential as between the IRS and the 
taxpayer, subject to certain exceptions.18  Section 7431 of the Code provides redress 
for taxpayers in which such confidential taxpayer information is improperly 
released.19  What follows is a discussion of whether the disclosure activities of the 
                                                          
minimize one’s tax burden.  In fact it’s common sense, and private citizens shouldn’t 
be smeared in government press releases or news leaks for trying. … 
Not long ago, Congress was curtailing IRS abuses.  Perhaps post-Enron, the tax 
man feels as if he can once again get away with anything, even harassing honest 
Americans.  The agency falls under the purview of Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill 
and clearly needs adult supervision.  He might start by firing or sending to Siberia 
whoever was responsible for this abuse of government power.”   
The IRS Out of Control, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2002, at A16 (emphasis added). 
15Tax Analysts sent a Freedom of Information Act [hereinafter FOIA] request to the U.S 
Treasury Department seeking several documents, as described below: 
In particular, the FOIA request seeks any materials discussing the decision to attach 
privilege logs containing KPMG client names. …  Tax Analysts has asked for copies 
of any documentation discussing the decision to release to the press the petitions and 
some attachments on the day filed, and the court filings in electronic form soon 
afterward. The FOIA requests also seek memos or documents relating to the letters to 
the editor of the Wall Street Journal that were written by officials in the Treasury, IRS, 
and Justice Department, including draft versions of the letters. 
William A. Dobrovir, Tax Analysts Files FOIA Request for Treasury’s Shelter Summonses 
Enforcement Memos, 2002 TAX  NOTES TODAY 153-28 (August 6, 2002).   
16Tax Analysts sent a FOIA request to the IRS seeking several documents, as described 
below: 
In particular, the FOIA request seeks any materials discussing the decision to attach 
privilege logs containing KPMG client names. …  Tax Analysts has asked for copies 
of any documentation discussing the decision to release to the press the petitions and 
some attachments on the day filed, and the court filings in electronic form soon 
afterward. The FOIA requests also seek memos or documents relating to the letters to 
the editor of the Wall Street Journal that were written by officials in the Treasury, IRS, 
and Justice Department, including draft versions of the letters. 
Id. at 153-39. 
17Tax Analysts sent a FOIA request to the U.S Justice Department seeking several 
documents, as described below: 
In particular, the FOIA request seeks any materials discussing the decision to attach 
privilege logs containing KPMG client names. …  Tax Analysts has asked for copies 
of any documentation discussing the decision to release to the press the petitions and 
some attachments on the day filed, and the court filings in electronic form soon 
afterward.  The FOIA requests also seek memos or documents relating to the letters to 
the editor of the Wall Street Journal that were written by officials in the Treasury, IRS, 
and Justice Department, including draft versions of the letters. 
Id. at 153-41.  
1826 U.S.C. § 6103 (2002).  
19I.R.C. § 7431.  
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IRS in the KPMG case have violated the provisions of section 6103 of the Code and 
whether there is taxpayer redress for such violations under section 7431 of the Code 
II.  SUMMONS ENFORCEMENT ACTION DISCLOSURE 
The IRS has been waging a war with the “Big Five”20 (now “Big Four”)21 
accounting firms and certain other promoters22 for years over their alleged marketing 
of tax shelters.23  For example, after a long battle, the IRS recently came to a global 
agreement with one of the Big Four, PricewaterhouseCoopers (hereinafter PWC) that 
will settle tax shelter registration and maintenance issues relating to tax shelters 
PWC has marketed.24  On January 28, 2002, the IRS issued its first summons to 
KPMG, requesting information related to two alleged tax shelters25 allegedly 
promoted by KPMG.26  Several other summonses were later issued for additional 
alleged tax shelters allegedly promoted by KPMG.27  In response to the summons, 
KPMG put together a privilege log containing a list of documents relating to 
participants in the alleged tax shelters as well as providing the IRS with 
approximately 84 boxes of documents as well as the sworn testimony of certain 
individuals.28  In response to KPMG’s document production and privilege log, the 
IRS refuted KPMG’s privilege claim and claimed that KPMG needed to turn over 
the remaining documents on the privilege log that had yet to be turned over to the 
IRS as well as many other documents.29  On July 9, 2002, the IRS filed suit seeking 
                                                                
20Prior to the collapse of Arthur Andersen, the “Big Five” accounting firms included 
Arthur Andersen, KPMG, Deloitte & Touche, PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young.  
21The current “Big Four” accounting firms include KPMG, Deloitte & Touche, 
PriceaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young.  
22Another example of an alleged promoter of tax shelters being pursued by the IRS was 
the accounting firm of BDO Seidman, LLP, which also was the subject of a summons 
enforcement action on the same date that the KPMG summons enforcement action was filed.  
See David L. Lupi-Sher, IRS Moves Aggressively Against Accounting Firms Marketing Tax 
Shelters, 2002 TAX  NOTES TODAY 133-4 (July 10, 2002).  
23Tax Notes Today has reported that all the former Big Five accounting firms have been 
served with summonses relating to the alleged promotion of tax shelters.  See Sheryl Stratton, 
PWC Deal Heads Off Shelter Summons Enforcement, 2002 TAX  NOTES TODAY 125-1 (June 
27, 2002). 
24Id.  On June 27, 2002, the IRS announced that it had reached a deal with 
PricewaterhouseCoopers [hereinafter PWC] that will result in PWC paying a “substantial 
payment” to the IRS, PWC providing certain client information to the IRS in response to 
summonses, and PWC developing processes to ensure ongoing compliance with the tax shelter 
registration and investor list maintenance requirements. 
25The two alleged tax shelters were the FLIP and the OPIS strategies.  See Petition, supra 
note 8.  
26See Lupi-Sher, supra note 22, at 133-34.  
27See Petition, supra note 8. 
28See Lupi-Sher, supra note 22, at 133-34. 
29The IRS claimed that KPMG had failed to produce 1,129 of the 1,162 documents listed 
in the privilege log.  See Petition, supra note 8. 
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to enforce the civil summonses against KPMG.30  As part of its petition to enforce 
the civil summonses, the IRS attached the KPMG privilege log that listed the 
documents KPMG considered to be privileged.31  However, the IRS failed to redact 
the names of the taxpayers whose documents were contained in the privilege log, 
even though the taxpayers were not parties to the IRS enforcement action.32  As a 
result, the names of the taxpayers became public record and were printed in the WSJ 
shortly after the privilege log was made public33 as well as other media outlets.34 
On July 19, 2002, the IRS Office of Chief Counsel issued new guidelines for the 
review and disclosure of privilege logs or similar documents that identify third 
parties in court, including summons enforcement actions.35  The guidelines require 
that IRS counsel should closely examine any privilege log or similar document that 
will be made public and it should be presumed that the names of third parties who 
are not parties to the litigation be redacted from the privilege log before the privilege 
log is made public.36  Thus, the guidelines indicate that the IRS has apparently 
recognized the error of its ways in the KPMG case.37  The open question is whether 
current law allows redress to the taxpayers that were named in the KPMG case prior 
to the revised guidelines.  
                                                                
30Id. 
31Id. 
32Id. 
33Id. 
34Tax Notes Today reported that the more prominent names listed in the privilege log were 
disclosed in Forbes Magazine, the New York Times and Bloomberg.  See Stratton, supra note 
23, at 145-48. 
35See Internal Revenue Service, IRS Releases Requirements for Disclosure of Third-Party 
Information in Privilege Logs, 2002 TAX  NOTES TODAY 140-6, (July 19, 2002) [hereinafter 
IRS Release]. 
36Id.  
37This mea culpa was further evidenced by a letter written by the IRS Chief Counsel to the 
editors of the Wall Street Journal stating: 
We agree with the concerns expressed in your editorial of July 17 that no taxpayer 
should be “gratuitously humiliated” in court proceedings.  We take seriously our 
public responsibilities to preserve confidences, including, wherever possible, the 
names of innocent third parties.  It is for this reason that documents revealing the 
identity of third parties is unnecessary to the conduct of litigation are often redacted or 
filed under seal to protect their privacy. 
We want to reiterate that the facts that individuals were listed by KPMG on the 
privilege log filed in this suit does not necessarily mean that these individuals 
participated in tax shelters.  Nevertheless, it is clear in hindsight that, while such 
disclosure was permissible, it would have been better practice to redact the names 
from KPMG’s privilege log before it was filed in federal court or to ask the court’s 
permission to file it under seal.  The Office of Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue 
Service and the Tax Division of the Department of Justice are working on procedures 
that should avoid similar missteps in the future.” 
IRS Release, supra note 35, at 145-71. 
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III.  SECTION 6103 
A.  General Rule 
1.  The Law and Public Policy 
Section 6103(a) sets forth the general rule that taxpayer “return information” is 
generally confidential, subject to certain exceptions.38  Section 6103(b)(2) provides 
that “return information” includes taxpayer names as well as other information.39  
Additionally, commentators have indicated that the definition of “return 
information” has evolved to include virtually all information collected by the IRS 
regarding a person’s tax liability.40   
Congress was specific in its rationale for enacting section 6103.  The 
Congressional Record indicates that section 6103 was enacted to protect the 
taxpayer’s privacy and to ensure that confidential information obtained by the IRS in 
the course of collecting tax information is not misused.41  In the Tax Reform Act of 
1976, Congress reformed section 6103 and eliminated executive discretion regarding 
what information could be disclosed to which Federal agencies and established that 
tax information is confidential and is only subject to disclosure to the extent 
explicitly provided by the Code.42  Congress made this change having determined 
                                                                
3826 U.S.C. § 6103(a) provides in pertinent part: 
(a) General Rule. 
Returns and return information shall be confidential, and except as authorized by this 
title- 
(1) No officer or employee of the United States, 
(2) No officer or employee of any State, any local law enforcement agency 
receiving information under subsection (i)(7)(A), any local child support 
enforcement agency, or any local agency administering a program listed in 
subsection (l)(7)(D) who has or had access to returns or return information 
under this section, and 
(3)   No other person (or officer or employee thereof) who has or had access to 
returns or return information under subsection (e)(1)(D)(iii), paragraph (6), 
(12), or (16) of subjection (l), paragraph (2) or (4)(B) of subsection (m), or 
subsection (n), shall disclose any return or return information obtained by 
him in any manner in connection with his services as such an officer or an 
employee or otherwise or under the provisions of this section.  For purposes 
of this subsection, the term “officer or employee” includes a former officer 
or employee. 
Id. 
3926 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A) provides in pertinent part that “return information” means-”a 
taxpayer’s identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, 
deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, 
deficiencies, over assessments, or tax payments. …”  Id. (emphasis added)  
40See Allan Karnes & Roger Lirely, Striking Back At the IRS: Using Internal Revenue 
Code Provisions To Redress Unauthorized Disclosures of Tax Returns or Return Information, 
23 SETON HALL L. REV. 924, 933 (1993). 
41See S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Spec. Sess. 19, 317-18 (1976). 
42The U.S. Treasury Department reported in 2000 that: 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2002
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that taxpayers must have a reasonable expectation that their information would be 
kept private by the IRS.43  Congress also determined that if this expectation of 
privacy was abused, the public would lose confidence in the tax system itself.44   
The U.S. Treasury Department has previously listed several examples of where 
breaches of taxpayer confidentiality have led to compliance problems, including 
problems associated with the refund offset program,45 problems associated with 
needs-based government programs,46 and problems relating to qualifying for credit.47  
                                                          
By the mid-1970’s, there was increased Congressional and public concern about the 
widespread use of tax information by government agencies for purposes unrelated to 
tax administration.  This concern culminated with a total revision of section 6103 in 
the Tax Reform Act of 1976.  There, Congress eliminated Executive Discretion 
regarding what information could be disclosed to what Federal and state agencies.  
Under this second approach, Congress established a new statutory scheme in which 
tax information was confidential and not subject to disclosure except to the extent 
explicitly provided in the Code.  Although there have been many amendments to the 
law since that time, the basic statutory scheme established in 1976 remains in place 
today.   
Report to The Congress on Scope and Use of Taxpayer Confidentiality and Disclosure 
Provisions, Volume I:  Study of  General Provisios, Office of Tax Policy, Department of the 
Treasury, (Oct. 2000), Part Two, Section II, Paragraph A, at page 15 (emphasis added) 
43The U.S. Treasury Department reported in 2000 that: 
Congress recognized that the IRS had more information about citizens than any other 
Federal agency, and that other agencies routinely sought access to that information.  
Congress also recognized that citizens reasonably expected that the tax information 
they were required to supply to the IRS would be kept private. 
Report to The Congress on Scope and Use of Taxpayer Confidentiality and Disclosure 
Provisions, Volume I: Study of General Provisions, Office of Tax Policy, Department of the 
Treasury, (October, 2000), Part Two, Section II, Paragraph B, Subparagraph 5, at page 21 
[hereinafter Taxpayer Confidentiality] (emphasis added). 
44The U.S. Treasury Department reported in 2000 that:  “Congress also recognized that 
citizens reasonably expected that the tax information they were required to supply to the IRS 
would be kept private.  If the IRS abused that reasonable expectation of privacy, the loss of 
public confidence could seriously impair the tax system.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
45The U.S. Treasury Department reported in 2000 that: 
Breaching the confidentiality of returns and return information can affect compliance 
in several ways.  For example, the IRS determined that as a result of the institution of 
the refund offset program, some taxpayers changed their withholding (so that there 
would be no refund to offset) and a greater number of taxpayers stopped filing returns 
altogether.  [Footnote 72:  Over the period 1985-1988, the IRS found that $719 million 
was lost due to an increase in nonfilers, accounting for $621 million of the total, and 
an increase in balance-due filers, accounting for the remaining $98 million.  Over this 
same period, approximately $1.3 billion was offset from the same population.  See 
IRS Research Division, The Impact of Nontax Refund Offsets on Voluntary 
Compliance (Rev. 2/93) at 5-4.]… [T]he integrity of data provided to the IRS by 
taxpayers is undermined, diminishing the utility of the data for the very purpose for 
which it was originally collected and ultimately disclosed. 
Id. at 34 (emphasis added). 
46The U.S. Treasury Department reported in 2000 that: 
Overtly tying tax reporting to needs-based government benefits may lead some 
individuals to underreport their income in order to qualify for some benefits, thus 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss1/3
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In addition, the U.S. Treasury Department has found that “[t]axpayers who view the 
IRS as a resource for a variety of other interests will be less inclined to voluntarily 
turn over sensitive financial information out of a fear of where it might ultimately 
land.”48 
The case law also is very clear that taxpayer confidentiality should be a strong 
policy goal in tax administration. For example, the court in Diamond v. U.S49stated 
that the legislative purpose of creating section 6103 was to “strengthen taxpayers’ 
rights,”50 specifically to provide definitive rules relating to the confidentiality of tax 
returns due to the prior abuses in that area.51  Similarly, in Flippo v. United States,52 
the court discussed the fact that “our voluntary assessment system of tax action is in 
large measure dependent upon the realization of a taxpayer’s expectation that the 
information required of him would be kept confidential.”53 
Moreover, the Internal Revenue Manual, Handbook for Special Agents 
(hereinafter Manual) also makes it clear that IRS agents should maintain taxpayer 
confidentiality.  The Manual provides that: “Caution must be exercised not [to] 
damage the reputation of the taxpayer” by making disclosures, even if necessary, 
either “offensive or suggestive of any wrongdoing by the taxpayer.”54  The Manual 
also warns its agents against even limited or [circular] “mail circularization that may 
result in unwarranted embarrassment to the taxpayer.”55  
2.  Application to KPMG Enforcement Action 
It is very likely that the IRS disclosure of the confidential taxpayer information 
violates the general rule of section 6103(a).  The IRS disclosed the names of 
taxpayers by disclosing the unredacted privilege log in the KPMG petition.  
                                                          
jeopardizing tax collections….  [T]he integrity of data provided to the IRS by 
taxpayers is undermined, diminishing the utility of the data for the very purpose for 
which it was originally collected and ultimately disclosed. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
47The U.S. Treasury Department reported in 2000 that: 
Conversely, overtly tying tax reporting to the ability to qualify for loans, credit, etc., 
may lead some individuals to overreport their income. …  [T]he integrity of data 
provided to the IRS by taxpayers is undermined, diminishing the utility of the data for 
the very purpose for which it was originally collected and ultimately disclosed. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
48See Taxpayer Confidentiality, supra note 43, at 34. 
49944 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1991). 
50Id. at 434 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975)). 
51Id. at 437. 
52670 F. Supp. 638 (W.D. N.C. 1987), aff’d, 849 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1988). 
53Id. 
54Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Manual, Handbook for Special Agents, 
§ 347.2 at 9781-11. 
55Diamond, 944 F.2d at 434 (citing to Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Manual, 
Handbook for Special Agents § 347.1). 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2002
10 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1 
Taxpayer names are considered “return information” under section 6103.56  As such, 
the IRS violated the general rule of section 6103(a) regarding the disclosure of 
confidential “return information.”57 
In addition, the disclosure was a clear violation of public policy with respect to 
the named taxpayers.  As discussed above, there exists a strong public policy against 
such disclosures as indicated by legislative history,58 the U.S. Treasury Department,59  
case law,60 and the Manual.61  
B.  Exceptions 
Two of the exceptions which permit disclosure of “return information” are 
disclosure to certain Federal officers and employees for purposes of tax 
administration, including the Department of Justice62 and disclosures made in 
judicial and administrative proceedings.63  These two exceptions were created by 
Congress in order to balance concerns about maintaining taxpayer confidences and 
the integrity of the tax system with the need of certain government agencies’ need to 
view the information.64  
                                                                
5626 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A) provides in pertinent part that “return information” means-“a 
taxpayer’s identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, 
deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, 
deficiencies, over assessments, or tax payments. …”  Id. (emphasis added)  
5726 U.S.C. § 6103(a) provides in pertinent part: 
(a) General Rule. 
Returns and return information shall be confidential, and except as authorized by this 
title- 
(1) No officer or employee of the United States, 
(2) No officer or employee of any State, any local law enforcement agency 
receiving information under subsection (i)(7)(A), any local child support 
enforcement agency, or any local agency administering a program listed in 
subsection (l)(7)(D) who has or had access to returns or return information 
under this section , and 
(3) No other person (or officer or employee thereof) who has or had access to 
returns or return information under subsection (e)(1)(D)(iii), paragraph (6), 
(12), or (16) of subjection (l), paragraph (2) or (4)(B) of subsection (m), or 
subsection (n),shall disclose any return or return information obtained by 
him in any manner in connection with his services as such an officer or an 
employee or otherwise or under the provisions of this section.  For purposes 
of this subsection, the term “officer or employee” includes a former officer 
or employee. 
Id. 
58S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 317-18 (1976). 
59Taxpayer Confidentiality, supra note 43, at 34. 
60Diamond, 944 F.2d at 431. 
61Id. (citing to Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Manual, Handbook for Special 
Agents 347.1). 
6226 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2).   
6326 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4). 
64The U.S. Treasury Department reported in 2000 that: 
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1.  Department of Justice Exception 
a.  General Rule  
One of the exceptions that allows disclosure of “return information” involves a 
necessary disclosure to the Department of Justice in a court proceeding.65  IRC 
section 6103(h)(2) provides in pertinent part that: 
In a matter involving tax administration, a return or return information 
shall be open to inspection by or disclosure to officers and employees of 
the Department of Justice (including United States attorneys) personally 
and directly engaged in, and solely for their use in, any proceeding before 
a Federal grand jury or preparation for any proceeding (or investigation 
which may result in such a proceeding) before a Federal grand jury or 
any Federal or State court, but only if-the taxpayer is or may be a party to 
the proceeding, or the proceeding arose out of, or in connection with, 
determining the taxpayer's civil or criminal liability, or the collection of 
such civil liability in respect of any tax imposed under this title;66  
the treatment of an item reflected on such return is or may be related to 
the resolution of an issue in the proceeding or investigation;67 or  
such return or return information relates or may relate to a transactional 
relationship between a person who is or may be a party to the proceeding 
                                                          
Although Congress felt that the flow of tax information should be more tightly 
regulated, not everyone agreed where the lines should be drawn.  The debates on 
accessibility were most heated in the area of nontax criminal law enforcement.  One 
side, led by Senator Long, sought more liberal access rules in order to fight white 
collar crime, organized crime, and other violations of the law.  This side felt ‘the 
Justice Department is part of this Federal Government.  It is all one Government.’ 
[122 Cong. Rec. 23996 (July 27, 1976)(statement of Sen. Long)].  The other side, led 
by Senator Weicker, wanted very restrictive rules.  This side recognized that it was 
cheaper and easier for the Justice Department to come directly to the IRS.  But they 
also felt that when citizens prepared their tax returns, they prepared them for the IRS, 
and no one else. 
Ultimately, Congress amended section 6103 to provide that tax returns and 
return information are confidential and are not subject to disclosure, except in limited 
situations, as delineated by the Code, where disclosure is warranted.  In each area of 
allowable disclosure, Congress attempted to balance the particular office or agency’s 
need for the information with the citizen’s right to privacy, as well as the impact of the 
disclosure upon the continuation of compliance with the voluntary tax assessment 
system.  [Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., General 
Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 313-16 (Comm. Print 1976)].  In short, 
Congress undertook direct responsibility for determining the types and manner of 
permissible disclosures.   
Taxpayer Confidentiality, supra note 43, at 22 (emphasis added).  
6526 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2). 
6626 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
6726 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
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and the taxpayer which affects, or may affect, the resolution of an issue in 
such proceeding or investigation.”68   
b.  Application to KPMG Enforcement Action  
It is unlikely that the first of the three above exception subsections (hereinafter 
DOJ Collection Exception)69 applies to the KPMG case.  The summons enforcement 
action was directed at KPMG and not the named taxpayers.  The summons 
enforcement action proceeding did not arise out of, or in connection with, 
determining the named taxpayer's civil or criminal liability, or the collection of the 
named taxpayer’s civil tax liability.  While it is possible that at some point, the 
named taxpayers could become a party to the proceeding, this possibility does not 
appear strong enough to allow for an exception to the general rule regarding taxpayer 
confidentiality.  In addition, the IRS has yet to allege that the named taxpayers owe 
additional taxes, interest or penalties in the summons enforcement action.  Rather, 
the IRS is in the information gathering stage in the summons enforcement action, 
making a current disclosure of the named taxpayer’s information premature with 
respect to the DOJ Collection Exception’s application.  
It is also unlikely that the second of the three above exception subsections 
(hereinafter DOJ Resolution Exception)70 applies to the KPMG case.  The summons 
enforcement action was not seeking to resolve the treatment on the return of KPMG, 
who was the “taxpayer” in the summons enforcement action.  It is certainly possible 
that the named taxpayers’ returns could become a subject to examination by the IRS, 
this proceeding has not called the named taxpayers’ returns into question.  As such, 
making a current disclosure of the named taxpayer’s information does not appear to 
be covered by the DOJ Resolution Exception.  
The third of the above exception subsections is the most likely candidate to apply 
to the KPMG case (hereinafter DOJ Transactional Exception).  The DOJ 
Transactional Exception involves disclosure of return information that relates or may 
relate to a transactional relationship between a person who is or may be a party to the 
proceeding and the taxpayer which affects, or may affect, the resolution of an issue 
in such proceeding or investigation.71  The nature of the transactional relationship 
between the named taxpayers and KPMG is what was disclosed by the IRS.  KPMG 
is clearly a party to the summons enforcement action.  As such, it is possible that the 
IRS could argue that the release of the taxpayer’s name in the context of resolving 
the summons compliance issue is covered by the DOJ Transactional Exception.  
However, this is not likely to be a successful argument, as the IRS would have a 
difficult time proving that the release of the named taxpayer’s otherwise confidential 
information was necessary in any way to resolve whether KPMG was required to 
comply with the summonses.  The IRS did not need to release the names of the 
named taxpayers in order to enforce the summonses.  The IRS could have redacted 
the names of the individual taxpayers from the petition and made the same 
                                                                
6826 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2)(C) (emphasis added). 
6926 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2)(A). 
7026 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2)(B). 
7126 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2)(C). 
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arguments regarding enforcement of the summonses.  Had the IRS simply redacted 
the named taxpayers’ confidential information from the petition, the IRS could have 
still sought compliance from KPMG while protecting the taxpayers’ confidential 
information.  As such, it is unlikely that the DOJ Transactional Exception covers the 
IRS’ disclosure. 
2.  Judicial and Administrative Proceeding Exception   
a.  General Rule 
A second of the exceptions which allows disclosure of “return information” 
involves a necessary disclosure in an administrative or judicial proceeding.72  Tax 
Analysts has reported that the IRS is relying on this exception for its disclosure.73  
IRC section 6103(h)(4) provides in pertinent part that: 
A return or return information may be disclosed in a Federal or State 
judicial or administrative proceeding pertaining to tax administration, but 
only— if the taxpayer is a party to the proceeding, or the proceeding arose 
out of, or in connection with, determining the taxpayer's civil or criminal 
liability, or the collection of such civil liability, in respect of any tax 
imposed under this title;74 if the treatment of an item reflected on such 
return is directly related to the resolution of an issue in the proceeding;75 if 
such return or return information directly relates to a transactional 
relationship between a person who is a party to the proceeding and the 
taxpayer which directly affects the resolution of an issue in the 
proceeding;76 or to the extent required by order of a court pursuant to 
section 3500 of title 18, United States Code or rule 16 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, such court being authorized in the issuance 
of such order to give due consideration to congressional policy favoring 
the confidentiality of returns and return information as set forth in this 
title.  However, such return or return information shall not be disclosed as 
provided in the above subparagraphs if the Secretary determines that such 
disclosure would identify a confidential informant or seriously impair a 
civil or criminal tax investigation.77   
                                                                
7226 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2). 
73Tax Analysts’ reported that: 
According to a source familiar with the case, the government is relying on section 
6103(h)(4)(A), which allows for the disclosure of taxpayer information in a judicial 
tax proceeding if the taxpayer is a party to the proceeding or the proceeding arises out 
of a determination of the taxpayer’s liability. 
Amy Hamilton, Shelter Customer Disclosure Affects California Campaign, 2002 TAX  NOTES  
TODAY 138-5 (July 17, 2002). 
7426 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(A). 
7526 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(B).   
7626 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(C).   
7726 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(D).   
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b.  Application to KPMG Enforcement Action  
It has been reported that the IRS believes the first of the four above exception 
subsections (hereinafter Administrative Collection Exception)78 applies to the KPMG 
case.79 As discussed above, the summons enforcement action was directed at KPMG.  
The summons enforcement action was not directed at the named taxpayers.80  The 
possibility that the named taxpayers could become a party to the proceeding at some 
future date does not appear strong enough to allow for the IRS to have violated the 
general rule regarding taxpayer confidentiality.  Also, as discussed above, the 
summons enforcement action did not arise out of, or in connection with, determining 
the named taxpayer’s civil or criminal liability, or the collection of the named 
taxpayer’s civil tax liability.  The summons enforcement action did not allege that 
the named taxpayers owe additional taxes, interest, or penalties.  As such, the 
Administrative Collection Exception does not appear to apply to the IRS’ disclosure. 
It is also unlikely that the second of the four above exception subsections 
(hereinafter Administrative Resolution Exception)81 applies to the KPMG case.  As 
discussed above, the summons enforcement action was not seeking to resolve the 
treatment on the return of KPMG.82  KPMG was the “taxpayer” in the summons 
enforcement action and the summons enforcement action has not called the named 
                                                                
7826 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(A).   
79Tax Analysts’ reported that: 
In the government’s view, attaching KPMG’s privilege logs to the petition is permitted 
under section 6103(h)(4)(A); which allows disclosure which allows disclosure of 
return information if the taxpayer is a party to a proceeding that arises out of a 
determination of the taxpayer’s liability.  The government interprets broadly the 
definition of return information.  KPMG is the taxpayer to the proceeding, and its 
privilege logs are considered the firm’s tax information, according to a source familiar 
with the case. 
As for the argument that the names of KPMG’s clients are their own tax 
information, the government’s position is that the privilege logs contain names of 
recipients of documents.  Whether those names are return information depends on 
whether the names are part of a file or an investigation of those other people, 
according to the source.  The government’s analysis for purposes of this enforcement 
action is that KPMG is the taxpayer under investigation, and that it does not know 
whether the privilege log descriptions contain anyone else’s tax return information. 
All the information in the privilege logs are “other data” and are the “return 
information” of KPMG, the source explained the government’s argument.  The Justice 
Department reasons that just because a person’s name is mentioned in a document 
given to the IRS doesn’t mean that the document, or that part of the document, is the 
person’s return information.  For example, the source explained, information obtained 
by the IRS in the examination of A becomes the “return information” of A and not B, 
even if that information also mentions B.  In the government’s view, the document is 
the return information of the person whose liability is under examination.” 
Taxpayer Confidentiality: Civilian Casualty in War on Shelters?, 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY  
140-1 (July 19, 2002) (hereinafter Civilian Casualty). 
80Id. 
8126 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(B). 
82Id. 
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taxpayers’ returns into question.  As such, the Administrative Resolution Exception 
does not appear to apply to the IRS’ disclosure. 
The third of the four above exception subsections (hereinafter Administrative 
Transactional Exception)83 provides the IRS’ best case for justifying the disclosure of 
the named taxpayers’ information.  However, it has been reported that the IRS is not 
relying on this section.84  The Administrative Transactional Exception involves 
disclosure of return information that relates or may relate to a transactional 
relationship between a person who is or may be a party to the proceeding and the 
taxpayer which affects, or may affect, the resolution of an issue in such proceeding 
or investigation.85  Clearly, there existed a transactional relationship between the 
named taxpayers and KPMG, and the documents relating to the transactions that 
linked the named taxpayers and KPMG are what the IRS is seeking to have KPMG 
disclose.  It is clear that KPMG is a party to the summons enforcement action, and 
thus, the IRS might make the argument that in seeking to enforce compliance with 
the summonses, the release of the named taxpayer’s information is covered by the 
Administrative Transactional Exception.  However, as discussed above, this is not 
likely to be a successful argument, because the IRS would likely be unable to 
establish that enforcing compliance with the summonses required the release of the 
named taxpayer’s confidential information.  The IRS could have made the same 
arguments regarding enforcement of the summonses while redacting the names of 
the involved taxpayers from the petition.  As such, it is unlikely that the 
Administrative Transactional Exception covers the IRS’ disclosure. 
The last of the four above exception subsections86 is not likely to apply to the 
KPMG case because there was no court order issued that required the disclosure.   
IV.  SECTION 7431 
A.  General Rule 
An unauthorized disclosure of taxpayer information can lead to a cause of 
action.87  The cause of action may arise either where the disclosure is made by an 
employee of the United States (such as an IRS agent)88 or by a person not employed 
by the United States.89  IRC section 7431(a) provides in pertinent part that: 
If any officer or employee of the United States knowingly, or by reason of 
negligence, inspects or discloses any return or return information with 
respect to a taxpayer in violation of any provision of Section 6103, such 
                                                                
8326 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(C).   
84See Civilian Casualty, supra note 79, at 140-1. 
8526 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(C).   
8626 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(D).   
87I.R.C. § 7431.   
88I.R.C. § 7431(a)(1).   
89I.R.C. § 7431(a)(2).  
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taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages against the United States in 
a district court of the United States,90 and 
If any person who is not an officer or employee of the United States 
knowingly, or by reason of negligence, inspects or discloses any return or 
return information with respect to a taxpayer in violation of any provision 
of Section 6103, such taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages 
against such person in a district court of the United States.91  
B.  Statute of Limitations 
The statute of limitations for bringing the cause of action is two years from the 
date of discovery by the claimant.92  
C.  Good Faith but Erroneous Interpretation Exception 
No cause of action may arise where the disclosing party meets one of the 
exceptions to Section 7431.93  One of these exceptions is where the disclosing party 
has a good faith, but erroneous, interpretation of section 6103.94   
Section 7431 does not define what constitutes a “good faith” interpretation of 
Section 6103.  Only one District Court has held that the standard is a subjective 
test,95 while the Fifth Circuit,96 Sixth Circuit97 and Eighth Circuit98 have all held that 
the standard is an objective test.  For example, in Diamond v. United States, the 
                                                                
90I.R.C. § 7431(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
91I.R.C. § 7431(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
92I.R.C. § 7431(d) provides in pertinent part:  “Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, an action to enforce any liability created under this section may be brought, without 
regard to the amount in controversy, at any time within 2 years after the date of discovery by 
the plaintiff of the unauthorized inspection or disclosure.”  Id. (emphasis added) 
93I.R.C. § 7431(b) provides in pertinent part:  “No liability shall arise under this section 
with respect to any inspection or disclosure- (1) which results from a good faith, but 
erroneous, interpretation of section 6103, or (2) which is requested by the taxpayer.”  Id. 
(emphasis added.) 
94I.R.C. § 7431(b)(1). 
95See Taylor v. United States, 186 B.R. 441, 450-51 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (citing to Lebaron 
v. United States, 794 F. Supp. 947, 954 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (noting that only the district court for 
the district of Minnesota had interpreted the good faith standard to contain a subjective 
element). 
96See generally Huckaby v. United States, 794 F.2d 1041, 1048 (5th Cir. 1986); see also 
Gandy v. United States, 234 F. 3d 281 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming the application of the good 
faith standard of § 7431 should be determined by an objective standard); Payne v. United 
States, 289 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the fifth circuit evaluates good faith under an 
objective standard). 
97See Taylor, 186 B.R. at 450-51.  
98See generally Diamond, 944 F.2d at 431; see also Rorex v. Traynor, 771 F. 2d 383, 387 
(8th Cir. 1985). 
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Eighth Circuit held that the “good faith” test is an objective test.99  The Court’s logic 
was partly based on the fact that the predecessor statute to section 7431 called for an 
objective standard to apply.100  In addition, the Court held that the objective test was 
met by the United States where the United States correctly interpreted section 6103 
and the individual agent misinterpreted section 6103.101  The Court explained that the 
objective standard is met where a government official is not liable for purposes of 
the “good faith” test, provided that such official’s conduct does not violate statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a “reasonable person would have known.”102  The 
Sixth Circuit has held that the objective test is measured by what a “reasonable IRS 
agent” would have known.103  As such, the “good faith” test for purposes of section 
7431 appears to be a broader test that is more easily met than the test for meeting an 
exception to Section 6103.  Essentially, if an average IRS agent would reasonably 
believe that the agent was not committing a section 6103 violation, then no Section 
7431 cause of action will be permitted, even if an actual violation of Section 6103 
has occurred. 
D.  Damages 
A defendant found to have violated this provision104 could be liable for 
significant damages.105  Such damages would be the sum of three amounts.106  The 
                                                                
99Diamond, 944 F.2d at 435-36 (citing to Rorex, 771 F.2d at 387). 
100Id.  
101Husby v. United States, 672 F. Supp. 442, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that the IRS 
cannot collectively qualify as having met the good faith test); but see Diamond, 944 F2d. at 
435 n.7 (distinguishing Husby by stating that neither legal nor logical support was offered for 
this holding).   
102Diamond, 944 F.2d at 431 (citing Rorex, 771 F.2d at 387) (explaining that government 
officials are generally shielded from litigation when performing discretionary functions unless 
such function is a clear violation of statutory rights of a taxpayer) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
103See Gandy v. United States, 234 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Payne, 289 
F.3d at 384. 
104I.R.C. § 7431. 
105I.R.C. § 7431(c). 
106I.R.C. § 7431(c) provides in pertinent part: 
In any action brought under section (a), upon a finding of liability on the part of the 
defendant, the defendant shall be liable to the plaintiff in an amount equal to the sum 
of- 
 (1) the greater of – 
  (A) $1,000 for each act of unauthorized inspection or disclosure of a return or 
return information with respect to which such defendant is found liable, or 
  (B) the sum of- 
   (i) the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of such 
unauthorized inspection or disclosure, plus  
   (ii) in the case of a willful inspection or disclosure or an inspection or 
disclosure which is the result of gross negligence, punitive damages, plus 
 (2) the cost of the action, plus 
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first of these three is the greater of either (i) $1,000 per disclosure107 or (ii) actual 
damages of the taxpayer108 plus punitive damages where the disclosure was willful or 
due to gross negligence.109  The second of these three is the costs of the action.110   
The final of these is the party’s reasonable attorney’s fees,111 where certain 
conditions are met112 and these conditions differ depending on whether the United 
States is the disclosing party113 or the disclosing party is not the United States.114   
1.  Disclosing Party is Not United States 
With respect to where the IRS is not the disclosing party, reasonable attorney’s 
fees may be awarded only where the taxpayer is a “prevailing party” within the 
meaning provided in 26 U.S.C.S. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii).115  The definition of a 
“prevailing party” for purposes of I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) is a taxpayer who either 
(1) submits certain filings with the court that justify the taxpayer’s procedural 
requirements for attorney fees or (2) meets certain net worth requirements.  These 
requirements are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2412(d)(2)(B), both of which are referenced in 26 U.S.C.S. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii).   
Section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) provides that a “prevailing party” is a taxpayer who 
meets the requirements of the first sentence of section 2412(d)(1)(B) of title 28, 
United States Code, except to the extent differing procedures are established by rule 
                                                          
 (3) in the case of a plaintiff which is described in section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii), 
reasonable attorneys fees, except that if the defendant is the United States, reasonable 
attorneys fees may be awarded only if the plaintiff is the prevailing party (as 
determined under section 7430(c)(4)).  
Id. (emphasis added.) 
107I.R.C. § 7431(c)(1)(A). 
108I.R.C. § 7431(c)(1)(B)(i). 
109I.R.C. § 7431(c)(1)(B)(ii).   
110I.R.C. § 7431(c)(2). 
111I.R.C. § 7431(c)(3). 
112I.R.C. § 7431(c)(3) sets out different conditions depending on whether the United States 
is the disclosing party.  I.R.C. § 7431(c)(3) provides in pertinent part:  “In the case of a 
plaintiff which is described in section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii), reasonable attorneys fees, except that 
if the defendant is the United States, reasonable attorneys fees may be awarded only if the 
plaintiff is the prevailing party (as determined under section 7430(c)(4)).”  Id. (emphasis 
added) 
113If the United States is the disclosing party, then I.R.C. § 7431(c)(3) provides that 
reasonable attorneys fees may be awarded for taxpayers described in I.R.C. 
§ 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) and the taxpayer is the prevailing party as determined in 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7430(c)(4).   
114If the United States is not the disclosing party, then I.R.C. § 7431(c)(3) provides that 
reasonable attorneys fees may be awarded for taxpayers described in 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii). 
115I.R.C. § 7431(c)(3). 
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of court and meet the requirements of section 2412(d)(2)(B) of title 28.116  The first 
sentence of title 28, section 2412(d)(1)(B) provides:  
A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty 
days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for 
fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a prevailing party 
and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection, and the amount 
sought, including an itemized statement from any attorney or expert 
witness representing or appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual 
time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were 
computed.117 
In addition, Title 28, section 2412(d)(2)(B) provides in pertinent part: 
“party” means-118 
an individual whose net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the 
civil action was filed,119 or 
any owner of an unincorporated business, or any partnership, corporation, 
association, unit of local government, or organization, the net worth of 
which did not exceed $7,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, and 
which had not more than 500 employees at the time the civil action was 
filed; except that an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3)) exempt from 
taxation under section 501(a) of such Code, or a cooperative association 
as defined in section 15(a) of the Agricultural Marketing Act (12 U.S.C. 
1141j(a)), may be a party regardless of the net worth of such organization 
or cooperative association or for purposes of subsection (d)(1)(D), a small 
entity as defined in section 601 of title 5.120 
Lastly, there are special rules set forth for meeting the above net worth 
requirement where the taxpayer is an estate,121 a trust,122 a joint filer,123 or where the 
eventual judgment is less than the taxpayer’s offer.124   
                                                                
11626 U.S.C.§ 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii). 
11728 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
11828 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). 
11928 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). 
12028 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). 
12126 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(D)(i)(I) provides the following:   
Special rules for applying net worth requirement. In applying the requirements of 
section 2412(d)(2)(B) of title 28, United States Code, for purposes of subparagraph 
(A)(ii) of this paragraph —  
 (i) the net worth limitation in clause (i) of such section shall apply to —  
  (I) an estate but shall be determined as of the date of the decedent’s death .… 
Id. 
12226 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(D)(i)(II) provides the following: 
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2.  Disclosing Party is United States 
Where the disclosing party is the United States, reasonable attorney’s fees may 
be awarded only where the taxpayer both (1) meets the definition of a “prevailing 
party” for purposes of IRC § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii), as outlined above, as either a 
taxpayer who submits certain filings with the court that justify the taxpayer’s 
procedural requirements for attorney fees125 or meets certain net worth 
                                                          
Special rules for applying net worth requirement. In applying the requirements of 
section 2412(d)(2)(B) of title 28, United States Code , for purposes of subparagraph 
(A)(ii) of this paragraph —  
 (i) the net worth limitation in clause (i) of such section shall apply to —  
  (II) a trust but shall be determined as of the last day of the taxable year 
involved in the proceeding .…  
Id. 
12326 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(D)(ii) provides the following: 
Special rules for applying net worth requirement. In applying the requirements of 
section 2412(d)(2)(B) of title 28, United States Code , for purposes of subparagraph 
(A)(ii) of this paragraph —  
 (ii) individuals filing a joint return shall be treated as separate individuals for 
purposes of clause (i) of such section.” 
Id. 
12426 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(E) provides the following: 
Special rules where judgment less than taxpayer's offer.  
In general. A party to a court proceeding meeting the requirements of 
subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be treated as the prevailing party if the liability of the 
taxpayer pursuant to the judgment in the proceeding (determined without regard to 
interest) is equal to or less than the liability of the taxpayer which would have been so 
determined if the United States had accepted a qualified offer of the party under 
subsection (g) .  
 (ii) Exceptions. This subparagraph shall not apply to—  
  (I) any judgment issued pursuant to a settlement; or  
  (II) any proceeding in which the amount of tax liability is not in issue, 
including any declaratory judgment proceeding, any proceeding to enforce 
or quash any summons issued pursuant to this title, and any action to 
restrain disclosure under section 6110(f) .  
 (iii) Special rules. If this subparagraph applies to any court proceeding—  
  (I) the determination under clause (i) shall be made by reference to the last 
qualified offer made with respect to the tax liability at issue in the 
proceeding; and  
  (II) reasonable administrative and litigation costs shall only include costs 
incurred on and after the date of such offer.  
 (iv) Coordination. This subparagraph shall not apply to a party which is a 
prevailing party under any other provision of this paragraph. (emphasis added) 
Id. 
12528 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). 
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requirements,126 and (2) is the “prevailing party”127 in the lawsuit with the United 
States as provided in IRC § 7430(c)(4).128   
IRC § 7430(c)(4) provides in pertinent part: 
In general. The term “prevailing party” means any party in any 
proceeding to which subsection (a)129 applies (other than the United States 
or any creditor of the taxpayer involved)— 130 
which— 131 
has substantially prevailed with respect to the amount in controversy,132 or  
has substantially prevailed with respect to the most significant issue or set 
of issues presented,133 and 
which meets the requirements of the 1st sentence of section 2412(d)(1)(B) 
of title 28, United States Code (as in effect on October 22, 1986) except to 
the extent differing procedures are established by rule of court and meets 
the requirements of section 2412(d)(2)(B) of such title 28 (as so in 
effect).134  
As such, the general definition of “prevailing party” for purposes of IRC 
§ 7430(c)(4) is a taxpayer who has either prevailed as to the amount in controversy135 
or has prevailed on the issue in the case.136   
                                                                
12628 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). 
127I.R.C. § 7431(c)(3). 
128I.R.C. § 7431(c)(3). 
12926 U.S.C. § 7430(a) provides in pertinent part: 
(a) In general.  
In any administrative or court proceeding which is brought by or against the 
United States in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax, 
interest, or penalty under this title, the prevailing party may be awarded a judgment or 
a settlement for—  
 (1) reasonable administrative costs incurred in connection with such 
administrative proceeding within the Internal Revenue Service, and  
 (2) reasonable litigation costs incurred in connection with such court proceeding. 
Id. 
13026 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A). 
13126 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(i). 
13226 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(i)(I). 
13326 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(i)(II). 
13426 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii). 
13526 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(i)(I). 
13626 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(i)(II). 
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However, the United States may not be liable where its position can be 
substantially justified. With respect to this exception, IRC § 7430(c)(4) provides in 
pertinent part:   
Exception if United States establishes that its position was substantially 
justified.137  
General rule. A party shall not be treated as the prevailing party in a 
proceeding to which subsection (a) applies if the United States establishes 
that the position of the United States in the proceeding was substantially 
justified.138  
Presumption of no justification if Internal Revenue Service did not follow 
certain published guidance. For purposes of [the General Rule],139 the 
position of the United States shall be presumed not to be substantially 
justified if the Internal Revenue Service did not follow its applicable 
published guidance140 in the administrative proceeding. Such presumption 
may be rebutted.141  
Effect of losing on substantially similar issues. In determining for 
purposes of [the General Rule]142 whether the position of the United States 
was substantially justified, the court shall take into account whether the 
United States has lost in courts of appeal for other circuits on 
substantially similar issues.143  
Thus, even where the taxpayer has satisfied the general rule, the taxpayer will 
still not be the “prevailing party” where the United States either:  “(1) establishes 
that its position in the proceeding was substantially justified; 144 or (2) the IRS 
                                                                
13726 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B). 
13826 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(i). 
139The bracketed information has replaced the term “clause (i)” to better allow the reader 
to follow the flow of the statute.   
14026 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(iv) specifies what constitutes “applicable published 
guidance.”  IRC § 7430(c)(4)(B)(iv) provides: 
(iv) Applicable published guidance. For purposes of clause (ii), the term “applicable 
published guidance” means—  
 (I) regulations, revenue rulings, revenue procedures, information releases, 
notices, and announcements, and  
 (II) any of the following which are issued to the taxpayer: private letter rulings, 
technical advice memoranda, and determination letters.  (emphasis added) 
Id. 
14126 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). 
142The bracketed information has replaced the term “clause (i)” to better allow the reader 
to follow the flow of the statute.   
14326 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(iii) (emphasis added). 
14426 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B). 
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properly followed its own ‘applicable published guidance’145 in the administrative 
proceeding,”146 provided that, the proper authority does not determine that the United 
States has lost in courts of appeal for other circuits on substantially similar issues147 
and (1) or (2) above is determined by the proper authority.148 
E.  Application to KPMG Enforcement Action 
The IRS disclosure of confidential taxpayer names appears to meet the general 
rule giving rise to a cause of action.149  As discussed above, the general rule provides, 
in pertinent part, that a civil cause of action against the United States for damages 
arises where an employee of the United States knowingly or negligently, discloses 
any return information with respect to a taxpayer in violation of any provision of 
section 6103.150  The petitioning party that disclosed the named taxpayers in the 
privilege log was the United States.  Thus, an employee of the United States must 
have prepared the petition.  It is clear that confidential taxpayer return information 
was disclosed when the named taxpayers were identified upon the privilege log 
becoming public information.  As such, provided there was a violation of section 
6103, the named taxpayers likely meet the general rule for having a cause of action 
against the United States.   
It is unlikely, however, that the named taxpayers would recover damages from a 
cause of action against the United States for a violation of section 6103.  The United 
States is likely to have a successful defense of any such cause of action by meeting 
                                                                
14526 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(iv) specifies what constitutes “applicable published 
guidance.”  IRC § 7430(c)(4)(B)(iv) provides: 
(iv) Applicable published guidance. For purposes of clause (ii), the term “applicable 
published guidance” means—  
 (I) regulations, revenue rulings, revenue procedures, information releases, 
notices, and announcements, and  
 (II) any of the following which are issued to the taxpayer: private letter rulings, 
technical advice memoranda, and determination letters. (emphasis added) 
Id. 
14626 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(ii). 
14726 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(iii). 
14826 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(C) sets forth that if the parties cannot agree as to who the 
“prevailing party” is for purposes of IRC § 7430(c)(4), then the IRS shall make the 
determination if the issue is resolved at the administrative level, and the determination shall be 
made by the court where the issue is resolved in court.  IRC § 7430(c)(4)(C) provides in 
pertinent part: 
(C) Determination as to prevailing party. Any determination under this paragraph as 
to whether a party is a prevailing party shall be made by agreement of the parties 
or—  
 (i) in the case where the final determination with respect to the tax, interest, or 
penalty is made at the administrative level, by the Internal Revenue Service, or  
 (ii) in the case where such final determination is made by a court, the court.  
(emphasis added) 
Id. 
149I.R.C. § 7431(a)(1). 
150I.R.C. § 7431(a)(1). 
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the exception where the disclosing party has a good faith, but erroneous, 
interpretation of section 6103.151  In the present case, based on reported IRS 
commentary, it appears that the IRS had a subjective good faith belief that disclosure 
of the privilege log did not violate section 6103.152  However, as discussed above, the 
objective “good faith” test is met based on what a reasonable IRS agent can be 
expected to know.  As such, it appears that the IRS would have an easier time 
meeting the section 7431 “good faith” test than the IRS would have meeting an 
exception to section 6103.  Provided that an average IRS agent would believe that 
there had been no section 6103 violation, then a taxpayer would be unlikely to 
succeed in bringing a section 7431 cause of action, even if the IRS had committed an 
actual violation of section 6103. 
Here, it also appears that the IRS may satisfy the objective test by arguing that an 
average IRS agent would believe that the KPMG privilege logs were permitted 
disclosures under section 6103(h)(4)(A).  The IRS would argue that a reasonable IRS 
agent would believe that disclosure of return information is permitted because 
KPMG is a party to a proceeding that arises out of a determination of KPMG’s 
liability.  The government would argue that KPMG is the taxpayer to the proceeding, 
and its privilege logs are considered KPMG’s tax information.  The government 
would further argue that the privilege logs contain names of recipients of documents 
and the government would take the position that any disclosure is incidental to 
KPMG’s enforcement action and that as a result, a reasonable IRS agent would not 
know whether the privilege log descriptions contain anyone else’s tax return 
information.  Essentially, the named taxpayers’ names became part of KPMG’s 
return information and therefore, since KPMG is the taxpayer under investigation, 
                                                                
151I.R.C. § 7431(b)(1). 
152Tax Analysts’ reported that: 
In the government’s view, attaching KPMG’s privilege logs to the petition is permitted 
under section 6103(h)(4)(A); which allows disclosure of return information if the 
taxpayer is a party to a proceeding that arises out of a determination of the taxpayer’s 
liability.  The government interprets broadly the definition of return information.  
KPMG is the taxpayer to the proceeding, and its privilege logs are considered the 
firm’s tax information, according to a source familiar with the case. 
As for the argument that the names of KPMG’s clients are their own tax 
information, the government’s position is that the privilege logs contain names of 
recipients of documents.  Whether those names are return information depends on 
whether the names are part of a file or an investigation of those other people, 
according to the source.  The government’s analysis for purposes of this enforcement 
action is that KPMG is the taxpayer under investigation, and that it does not know 
whether the privilege log descriptions contain anyone else’s tax return information. 
All the information in the privilege logs are “other data” and are the “return 
information” of KPMG, the source explained the government’s argument.  The Justice 
Department reasons that just because a person’s name is mentioned in a document 
given to the IRS doesn’t mean that the document, or that part of the document, is the 
person’s return information.  For example, the source explained, information obtained 
by the IRS in the examination of A becomes the “return information” of A and not B, 
even if that information also mentions B.  In the government’s view, the document is 
the return information of the person whose liability is under examination.” 
See Civilian Casualty, supra note 79, at 140-1. 
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the IRS may disclose KPMG’s return information in the enforcement action under 
section 6103(h)(4)(A).  
Based on the lower threshold, it is likely that the IRS would succeed on the 
“good faith” defense of any section 7431 cause of action.  For purposes of this 
Article, it is assumed that the IRS could meet this standard by evidencing that 
KPMG was the taxpayer in the summons enforcement action and that the IRS’ 
internal policies allowed disclosure of third party names when filing a petition to 
enforce KPMG’s summonses.  If Tax Analysts succeeds in its FOIA requests of the 
government, the decision making process of the government on this matter will be 
revealed and we will be able to determine whether this assumption is correct.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
The IRS has been battling the former “Big Five” (now “Big Four”) accounting 
firms and certain other promoters for years over their alleged marketing of tax 
shelters.153  On January 28, 2002, the IRS issued its first summons to one of the Big 
Four accounting firms, KPMG, requesting that KPMG provide documents relating to 
two alleged tax shelters154 allegedly promoted by KPMG.155  The IRS subsequently 
issued several other summonses to KPMG relating to additional alleged tax shelters 
purportedly promoted by KPMG.156  While providing the IRS with several boxes of 
documents and sworn testimony, KPMG also created a privilege log containing a list 
of documents relating to participants in the alleged tax shelters.157  The IRS 
responded to KPMG’s document production and privilege log by refuting KPMG’s 
privilege claim and requesting additional documents not previously requested.158  On 
July 9, 2002, the IRS filed a summons enforcement action lawsuit against KPMG.159  
The IRS included the privilege log as part of its petition in the summons enforcement 
action.160  The IRS did not redact the names of the taxpayers who whose documents 
were contained in the privilege log, regardless of the fact that the taxpayers were not 
parties to the IRS lawsuit.161  The public disclosure of these taxpayers’ relationship 
with KPMG in the context of alleged tax shelter activity became public knowledge.  
The WSJ disclosed many of the taxpayer names in a front page article.162  The 
                                                                
153Tax Notes Today has reported that all the former Big Five accounting firms have been 
served with summonses relating to the alleged promotion of tax shelters.  See PWC Deal 
Heads Off Shelter Summons Enforcement, 2002 TAX  NOTES TODAY 125-1 (June 27, 2002). 
154The two alleged tax shelters were the FLIP and the OPIS strategies.  See Petition, supra 
note 8. 
155See Lupi-Sher, supra note 22, at 133-34. 
156See Petition, supra note 8. 
157See Lupi-Sher, supra note 22, at 133-34.  
158The IRS claimed that KPMG had failed to produce 1,129 of the 1,162 documents listed 
in the privilege log.  See Petition, supra note 8. 
159Id. 
160Id.  
161Id.  
162Id. 
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disclosure of the taxpayer names caused a strong public reaction and subsequently, 
the IRS Office of Chief Counsel issued new guidelines that likely would have 
foreclosed the disclosures had the guidelines been in existence prior to the public 
disclosure.163  Freedom of Information Act requests have been made by Tax Analysts 
to the U.S. Treasury Department,164 the IRS165 and DOJ166 seeking to discover 
internal government documents relating to who made this decision and how it was 
made.  Section 6103 provides that the IRS must maintain the confidentiality of 
certain taxpayer information, subject to certain exceptions.167  Section 6103(a) sets 
forth the general rule that taxpayer “return information” is generally confidential, 
subject to certain exceptions.168  Section 6103(b)(2) provides that “return 
                                                                
163IRS Release, supra note 34. 
164Tax Analysts sent a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request to the U.S Treasury 
Department seeking several documents, as described below: 
In particular, the FOIA request seeks any materials discussing the decision to attach 
privilege logs containing KPMG client names. … Tax Analysts has asked for copies 
of any documentation discussing the decision to release to the press the petitions and 
some attachments on the day filed, and the court filings in electronic form soon 
afterward. The FOIA requests also seek memos or documents relating to the letters to 
the editor of the Wall Street Journal that were written by officials in the Treasury, IRS, 
and Justice Department, including draft versions of the letters. 
Dobrovir, supra note 15, at 153-28. 
165Tax Analysts sent a Freedom of Information Act or FOIA request to the IRS seeking 
several documents, as described below: 
In particular, the FOIA request seeks any materials discussing the decision to attach 
privilege logs containing KPMG client names. … Tax Analysts has asked for copies 
of any documentation discussing the decision to release to the press the petitions and 
some attachments on the day filed, and the court filings in electronic form soon 
afterward. The FOIA requests also seek memos or documents relating to the letters to 
the editor of the Wall Street Journal that were written by officials in the Treasury, IRS, 
and Justice Department, including draft versions of the letters. 
Dobrovir, supra note 15, at 153-39. 
166Tax Analysts sent a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request to the U.S Justice 
Department seeking several documents, as described below: 
In particular, the FOIA request seeks any materials discussing the decision to attach 
privilege logs containing KPMG client names. … Tax Analysts has asked for copies 
of any documentation discussing the decision to release to the press the petitions and 
some attachments on the day filed, and the court filings in electronic form soon 
afterward. The FOIA requests also seek memos or documents relating to the letters to 
the editor of the Wall Street Journal that were written by officials in the Treasury, IRS, 
and Justice Department, including draft versions of the letters. 
Dobrovir, supra note 15, at 153-41. 
16726 U.S.C. § 6103.  
16826 U.S.C. § 6103(a) provides in pertinent part: 
(a) General Rule. 
Returns and return information shall be confidential, and except as authorized by this 
title- 
 (1) No officer or employee of the United States, 
 (2) No officer or employee of any State, any local law enforcement agency 
receiving information under subsection (i)(7)(A), any local child support 
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information” includes taxpayer names as well as other information.169  It is likely that 
the United States violated the general rule of section 6103 because the United States 
improperly disclosed taxpayer names in the KPMG case.  In addition, it is not likely 
that the United States can rely on any of the exceptions to section 6103, as neither 
DOJ nor the IRS: 
(1) alleged in the summons enforcement action that the named taxpayers 
owe additional taxes, interest or penalties, nor did the summons 
enforcement action arise out of, or in connection with, determining the 
named taxpayer's civil or criminal liability, or the collection of the named 
taxpayer’s civil tax liability;170 
(2) were seeking via the summons enforcement action to resolve the 
treatment on the return of KPMG;171 or  
(3) disclosed the return information pursuant to a transactional 
relationship between the named taxpayer and KPMG which affects, or 
may affect, the resolution of an issue in the summons enforcement 
action.172   
Section 7431 provides redress for taxpayers in which such confidential taxpayer 
information is improperly disclosed.173  Although the IRS disclosure of confidential 
taxpayer names appears to meet the general rule giving rise to a cause of action,174 it 
is unlikely that the named taxpayers would recover damages because the United 
States is likely to meet the exception where the disclosing party has a good faith, but 
erroneous, interpretation of section 6103.175  The United States would meet this 
                                                          
enforcement agency, or any local agency administering a program listed in 
subsection (l)(7)(D) who has or had access to returns or return information 
under this section , and 
 (3) No other person (or officer or employee thereof) who has or had access to 
returns or return information under subsection (e)(1)(D)(iii), paragraph (6), 
(12), or (16) of subjection (l), paragraph (2) or (4)(B) of subsection (m), or 
subsection (n), shall disclose any return or return information obtained by him 
in any manner in connection with his services as such an officer or an 
employee or otherwise or under the provisions of this section.  For purposes of 
this subsection, the term “officer or employee” includes a former officer or 
employee. 
Id. 
16926 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A) provides in pertinent part that “return information” means “a 
taxpayer’s identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, 
deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, 
deficiencies, over assessments, or tax payments. …”  Id. (emphasis added.)  
17026 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2)(A)-(h)(4)(A).   
17126 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2)(B)-(h)(4)(B).   
17226 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2)(C)-(h)(4)(C).   
173I.R.C. § 7431.  
174I.R.C. § 7431(a)(1). 
175I.R.C. § 7431(b)(1). 
27Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2002
28 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1 
exception by showing that a reasonable IRS agent would have believed that the agent 
could disclose the information.  For purposes of this Article, it is assumed that the 
IRS would be able to meet this threshold by showing that KPMG was the taxpayer in 
the summons enforcement action and that its internal policies dictated that it may 
disclose third party names when filing a petition to enforce KPMG’s summonses.  
Assuming Tax Analysts is successful in its FOIA requests of the government, the 
decision making process of the government on this matter will illuminate whether 
this assumption is borne out by the facts. 
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